Monday, June 30, 2003
Scalia to the Rescue!
It's been pointed out to me that Justice O'Connor specifically exempted marriage from her "moral disapproval" argument that I made earlier.
But Justice Scalia, in his dissent, comes to my rescue
It's been pointed out to me that Justice O'Connor specifically exempted marriage from her "moral disapproval" argument that I made earlier.
Texas cannot assert any legitimate state interest here, such as national security or preserving the traditional institution of marriage. Unlike the moral disapproval of same-sex relations—the asserted state interest in this case—other reasons exist to promote the institution of marriage beyond mere moral disapproval of an excluded group.
But Justice Scalia, in his dissent, comes to my rescue
This reasoning leaves on pretty shaky grounds state laws limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples. JUSTICE O’CONNOR seeks to preserve them by the conclusory statement that “preserving the traditional institution of marriage" is a legitimate state interest. Ante, at 7. But “preserving the traditional institution of marriage" is just a kinder way of describing the State’s moral disapproval of same-sex couples. Texas’s interest in §21.06 could be recast in similarly euphemistic terms: “preserving the traditional sexual mores of our society." In the jurisprudence JUSTICE O’CONNOR has seemingly created, judges can validate laws by characterizing them as “preserving the traditions of society" (good); or invalidate them by characterizing them as “expressing moral disapproval" (bad).
